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The effects flowing from the financial 
crisis of 2008 are still with us. Europe is 
trying, with much difficulty, to straight-
en its financial affairs while the US has 
had to weather stop-start efforts to do 
the same. The news from the financial 
centres is grim, at best. Asia, meanwhile, 
seems to show some resilience but even 
here Japan appears to continue with its 
long struggle to reform its economy. In 
recent months China has also begun to 
suffer from the effects of the downturn 
in the West.
Amidst this state of affairs, South-
east Asia seems to be doing better than 
most. Many reasons have been posited 
for this state of affairs including the role 
that China has played in the region by 
being a buyer of commodities. But the 
history of economic growth in South-
east Asia also points to the fact that it 
had weathered a financial crisis of its 
own in 1997. Lessons were learnt at 
that time. Some of those lessons have 
been instructive.
An excessive reliance on finan-
cial markets and portfolio flows was 
dampened as countries in the region 
became wary of funds and fund man-
agers. The 1997 crisis began with the 
loss of confidence in the Thai currency 
and the Thai economy and then spilled 
over to the rest of the region. Malaysia 
instituted capital controls for a time 
while it restructured its economy. In-
donesia had to be bailed out by the 
International Monetary Fund. In all 
three countries political changes fol-
lowed from the impact of the financial 
crisis. In Thailand, new political actors 
became active with the rural popula-
tion becoming a determining feature 
of the political landscape. The cleavage 
between the urbanised middle class 
and the rural population became more 
stark as power shifted between differ-
ent parties – the red and yellow shirts. 
This shifting political movement has 
not ended. It continues to dominate the 
Thai political landscape.
In Malaysia, while there was no 
political instability as such, the party 
in power had to weather internal dis-
sension over the decision to institute 
capital controls. In the event, those in 
favour of broad-based IMF reforms 
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rather than capital controls were eased 
out. The effects of that decision are 
now more apparent. It gave birth to 
a coalition of opposition parties with 
a leadership to match. The following 
elections brought more opposition 
members into parliament, and the loss 
of several states within the Federation 
to opposition parties. This was a new 
phenomenon in a country which, for a 
long time, had been held together by 
an older and more established political 
constellation. New lessons in creating 
a different political architecture were 
being learnt.
Indonesia was the country which 
suffered most in the aftermath of 
the 1997 crisis. The Soeharto regime 
which had been in power for over 
thirty years and which had overseen 
the transformation of the country 
fell from grace. There were popular 
calls for democracy and devolution 
of power. Constitutional changes were 
drafted, new elections were called and 
the power of the military was curtailed. 
Civilian presidents came into office 
and efforts at political and administra-
tive devolution were put into effect. 
A new constellation of power centres 
across the archipelago became visible. 
No longer was the centre in Jakarta 
the only power to wield control over 
the provinces. The provincial authori-
ties, newly imbued with legislative 
and revenue sharing arrangements, 
became power centres in their own 
right. Where it was once possible to 
negotiate investment or business ar-
rangements for a province through 
Jakarta it now became essential for 
all such discussions to take place at 
both local and central levels with the 
final say being instituted by the prov-
ince itself. The impact of this change 
brought about by political devolution 
was the proliferation of political par-
ties, and the emergence of new business 
leaders in the provinces. At the heart 
of these changes in Indonesia lay the 
sense that something had to be done 
to improve the lot of the population. 
The economy turned inward. Export-
led production was downplayed when 
Indonesian companies could not afford 
to import materials for manufacturing 
as the currency went into a downward 
spiral. The response was swift. The 
Indonesian business community began 
to use local materials to produce for 
the domestic economy. While oil and 
gas and commodities continued to be 
exported, manufacturing refocused 
itself on the domestic consumer.
The success of both political devolu-
tion and economic restructuring gave 
rise to a sense of economic nationalism 
that has lasted till now. As an indicator, 
the economy quadrupled in size be-
tween 2000 and 2010 in nominal terms. 
This confidence in its own abilities has 
been characteristic of the Indonesian 
experiment in democracy and economic 
development of the last decade.
Thus the recent financial crisis in the 
West, while having an impact on the 
region, has been somewhat ameliorated 
by the structural changes that the region 
undertook after its own crisis in 1997. 
Domestic demand has cushioned the 
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loss of export markets while more pru-
dent supervision of portfolio flows has 
prevented the excesses seen elsewhere. 
Countries such as Singapore, which 
have a small population and a narrow 
domestic demand base, continue to be 
effected by the vagaries of the US and 
European financial crisis. Likewise, 
countries such as Vietnam which are 
dependent on manufactured exports 
are now having to negotiate through 
the effects of slow or stalling demand 
in the West. Thailand, however, is an 
unusual story. When the 1997 financial 
crisis unfolded, the urban population 
diffused into the rural sector as it did 
during previous economic downturns. 
The social construct of Thai society 
with its porous movement between the 
urban and rural populations has been 
its saviour, allowing the newly impov-
erished urbanised workers to melt into 
the rural economy.
In the larger countries of Southeast 
Asia, the size of domestic demand has 
been instrumental in cushioning the 
effects of the current recession. The 
lessons of the 1997 financial crisis 
have now been learnt. Self-reliance has 
become more apparent and with it, 
a renewed national consciousness. In 
Thailand, for example, the social and 
economic effects of the floods which 
destroyed manufacturing facilities last 
year have been rapidly overcome as the 
country set about remedying the flood 
defences and getting operations back 
on track. In Indonesia, the nationalist 
streak has expanded considerably as the 
provinces and the centre have become 
more confident of their capabilities to 
focus on the challenges of develop-
ment. Well trained and qualified private 
sector managers have been co-opted 
into senior decision-making positions 
within the government and they have 
given a confidence boost to national 
interests. In Malaysia, for example, the 
development of the southern tip of the 
peninsular bordering Singapore, in an 
area known as Iskandar Malaysia, there 
is a strong sense of competing against 
Singapore with Malaysian capabilities 
equal to that of the neighbour.
At the subregional level, the 1997 
crisis laid bare the disjoints in the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations 
(Asean). Indonesia, which was the 
anchor country in the arrangement, 
became pre-occupied with resolving 
its own future. At the same time it 
became clear that the group could not 
help individual countries weather the 
financial meltdown. The reasons for 
the creation of a single economic zone 
fell apart when political pressures to 
address national concerns came to the 
fore. Soon after, the chasm between the 
original founding members (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore 
and the Philippines) and the new mem-
bers (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and 
Myanmar) became apparent when a 
need for a staggered integration process 
had to be designed. This allowed for 
a longer time for the lesser developed 
new members to restructure and grow 
their economies before becoming a 
full part of the Asean community. But 
fissures continue to fester as the role 
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of China within the region has shown. 
At the recent Asean meeting in Phnom 
Penh in September, for the first time, 
the community could not issue a joint 
statement because of the territorial 
disputes that the Philippines and Viet-
nam had with China. It now appears 
that national interests have become 
more important than regional ones, 
and China has sought to exploit this 
structural impasse in its relations with 
the Asean community.
But these nationalist sentiments are 
not necessarily squared against global-
ization. They have augmented a long 
underlying sense that the different eth-
nic groups in Southeast Asia can, with 
the right capabilities, manage their own 
affairs. In many ways, the new nation-
alism and its associated confidence are 
fruits of what Dr Mahathir Mohamad, 
the former Malaysian prime minister, 
had tried to create in Malaysia. The 
paradox of this state of affairs is that 
it has come about as a result of a crisis 
brought about by a western model of 
capitalism that has lost its moral com-
pass. A model that many in the region 
had been forced to accept as part of the 
«Washington consensus». So now in the 
present recession, with China and India 
both suffering from the effects of declin-
ing demand in the West, Southeast Asia 
is applying the bitter lessons learnt at 
an earlier time - to become more self-
reliant. Perhaps that is the new term for 
economic nationalism?
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